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LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
and purpose of each statute. But if there is a direct conflict
between two acts which are to take effect simultaneously, then
it would seem that the court should declare both acts inoperative
and void, unless some reason may be found to show that the
Legislature intended one to prevail over the other.
Helen Marie Wimmer
MINERAL RIGHTs-AFTER-ACQUIRED TITLE DOCTRINE ---
REVERSIONARY INTEREST
In Long-Bell Lumber Company v. Granger, 63 So. 2d 420
(La. 1953), the Louisiana Supreme Court, speaking through Jus-
tice Hamiter, held that the sale of a second mineral servitude to
the owner of an existing mineral servitude on the same tract of
land was void since one may not validly purchase that which he
already owns.
This case involves a very complicated factual situation relat-
ing to a number of conveyances among various entities of the
Long-Bell interests, "the good faith separate existence of which
[was] .. .not challenged by the defendants."1 A brief statement
of the material facts are as follows:
In 1931 the Long-Bell Lumber Sales Corporation con-
veyed to the Long-Bell Minerals Corporation a mineral servi-
tude on the lands in dispute. In 1936 the Long-Bell Farm
Land Corporation, a sub-vendee of the Long-Bell Lumber
Sales Corporation, purported to convey a mineral servitude
on the same tract of land to the Long-Bell Petroleum Com-
pany, which had previously merged with the Long-Bell Min-
erals Corporation. In 1943 Long-Bell Farm Land Corpora-
tion sold the land to the defendants' authors in title and
reserved the mineral rights to the Long-Bell Petroleum Cor-
poration. The defendants, Miller and Granger, acquired the
lands by separate transactions in 1944 and 1946.
The plaintiffs brought these consolidated petitory actions
against the defendants after receiving adverse decisions in
previous jactitation suits.
The defendants' claim to the mineral interests in question
depended upon the effect of the 1936 deed. They contended that
1. Long-Bell Lumber Co. v. Granger, 63 So. 2d 420 (La. 1953).
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since the Long-Bell Lumber Company retained the land until
the original servitude prescribed in 1941, the 1936 sale was
effective under the doctrine of after-acquired title,2 and that
prescription began to run from the date of the sale. It was also
contended, particularly on application for rehearing, that the
1936 conveyance transferred the "reversionary interest"3 of the
landowner, and that title to this interest vested in Long-Bell
Petroleum Corporation when the original servitude prescribed.
This casenote will discuss each of these problems.
If the doctrine of after-acquired title had been held applicable
to the 1936 conveyance, and prescription held to have begun
from the date of the sale, the "second servitude" would have
prescribed in 1946, vesting ownership of the mineral interests in
the defendants. Previous cases lend some support to this position.
In White v. Hodges4 a landowner attempted to sell a mineral
interest to a third person while all the mineral rights were out-
standing. The court found that the landowner had sold some-
thing which belonged to another, but held that the purchaser
acquired the interest by the doctrine of after-acquired title. That
is, upon extinguishment of the previously existing servitudes by
prescription, the mineral rights reverted to their former owner
and hence inured to the benefit of the purchaser. The date when
prescription began to run against the interest acquired by the
purchaser was also at issue. After finding that the purchaser did
not have actual knowledge of the existing servitude, it was held
that prescription began to run on the date the outstanding servi-
tude prescribed.
The case of McDonald v. Richard5 presented a situation in
which the landowner purported to convey certain mineral inter-
ests to the plaintiff at a time when the entire mineral interests
were vested in a third party. Pursuant to the authority of
Article 2452, Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, the sale was declared
null. All of the mineral interests were outstanding. The court
stated, however, that if the vendor had retained the land, the
2. St. Landry Oil & Gas Co., Inc. v. Neal, 166 La. 799, 802, 118 So. 24, 25
(1928): "Ordinarily, where one sells the property of another-and the rule
is equally applicable to the granting or sale of mineral leases-and later
acquires title to the property sold by him, the title vests immediately in his
vendee."
3. "Reversionary interest" is a common law term. The term as used
here denotes the expectancy of the landowner to become owner at a future
date of an outstanding mineral servitude by prescription.
4. 201 La. 1, 9 So. 2d 433 (1942).
5. 203 La. 155, 13 So. 2d 712 (1943).
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purchaser would have acquired the mineral interest by the doc-
trine of after-acquired title the day the outstanding servitude
prescribed.
In Bates v. Monzingo,6 a later case, a landowner was said to
have "oversold"7 the mineral interests to his land. The oldest
outstanding mineral interest was that portion which had been
reserved by the landowner's vendor. It was not proved that any
of the outstanding interest at the time of the "oversale" had pre-
scribed, but the court said: "However, he [Monzingo] remained
the owner of the land until 1942, and therefore, if his own
vendor's one-half interest prescribed in 1937 [as contended],
that interest inured to Monzingo's benefit and also to the benefit
of any vendee of an interest theretofore 'oversold'." The rationale
by which the prescribed mineral interest would have inured to
the purchaser was not expressly stated by the court, but cases
discussing the applicability of the doctrine of after-acquired title
to mineral interests were cited as authorities.
The "reversionary interest" of the landowner in the out-
standing mineral interests to his land was first discussed in
Gailey v. McFarlain.8 There the court stated that it was an
object of value which could legally be sold, but found that the
parties had not intended its transfer. In Gulf Refining Company
v. Orr9 the court lent support to the possible validity of such a
sale, but emphasized that "reversionary interest" as the object
of a sale would not be implied from a deed.
In both McDonald v. Richard10 and Long-Bell Lumber Com-
pany v. Tritico," purported conveyances of mineral interests had
been made when all the mineral interests were already out-
standing. The deeds did not expressly indicate that a "rever-
sionary interest" had been conveyed. It was held that the con-
veyances were null, as the vendors had attempted to convey
that which they did not own. The doctrine of after-acquired title
was not applicable because the vendors sold the land prior to
prescription of the outstanding mineral interests.
The recognition, with qualifications, of the "reversionary
6. 221 La. 479, 59 So. 2d 693 (1952).
7. Technically, the word "oversold" seems to have been inappropriately
used, as there was no valid sale of any part of the thing sold.
8. 194 La. 150, 193 So. 570 (1940).
9. 207 La. 915, 22 So. 2d 269 (1945).
10. 221 La. 479, 59 So. 2d 693 (1952).
11. 216 La. 426, 43 So. 2d 782 (1949).
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interest" theory, as stated in the dicta of the above cases, seems
to have been denounced by the dicta in Liberty Farms, Inc. v.
Miller.12 There the court said: "One may not reserve reversion-
ary rights to minerals when he is not the owner of the minerals
at the time the reservation is made. It is settled that, in such
instances, the reservation is ineffective and the outstanding min-
eral interests revert to the person owning the land at the time
of prescription. 13
The court's reluctance to uphold the sale of a reversionary
right appears to be based upon a strict adherence to the spirit of
the prescription laws. In McDonald v. Richard 4 the court quoted
from the language in Martel v. A. Veeder Company 5 as follows:
"The fundamental rule of public policy that a debtor, or an obligor
in the case of a servitude or real right, cannot renounce in
advance the benefit of prescription which may release him or his
land from the obligation." Perhaps, too, the court does not wish
to introduce another complicated rule of property.
If the court had recognized the 1936 deed in the instant case
as the sale of a "reversionary interest," it is possible that pre-
scription would have been held to run from the date of the sale.
This was discussed in dicta in McDonald v. Richard,6 where the
court stated that the outstanding servitude at the time of the
sale would not be an obstacle which would prevent the running
of prescription, because it would have been consented to by the
purchaser.
The court in the instant case said: "Clearly the doctrine of
after acquired title cannot be applied to the 1936 mineral deed,
even assuming that it is applicable to mineral sales in some
instances.' u7 The inapplicability of the doctrine of after-acquired
title, in the light of Article 2443 of the Civil Code, 8 could hardly
be questioned, inasmuch as the interest purportedly purchased
was held to have been the same as that already owned by the
purchaser. The statement by the court seems to imply that the
doctrine of after-acquired title may be subject to different rules
12. 216 La. 1023, 45 So. 2d 610 (1950).
13. 216 La. 1023, 1033, 45 So. 2d 610, 614 (1950).
14. 221 La. 479, 59 So. 2d 693 (1952).
15. 199 La. 423, 439, 6 So. 2d 335, 340 (1942).
16. 221 La. 479, 59 So. 2d 693 (1952).
17. 203 La. 155, 166, 13 So. 2d 712, 716 (1943).
18. Art. 2443, La. Civil Code of 1870: "He who is already the owner of a
thing, cannot validly purchase it. If he buys it through error, thinking it




of application when mineral interests are involved. The previous
cases, however, have indicated that the doctrine of after-acquired




Watkins, defendant, sold land to Wise, plaintiff, on July 13,
1929, reserving to himself a mineral servitude. W. T. Gleason
sold other land to R. R. Gleason, another defendant, on Decem-
ber 31, 1932, reserving a mineral servitude. On April 6, 1934,
R. R. Gleason sold this land to Wise, reserving to himself the
minerals previously reserved by W. T. Gleason. On April 30,
1936, Wise and Watkins, and Wise and W. T. Gleason executed
mineral leases on both tracts of land. On October 21, 1940, these
leases were extended to April 30, 1943. On July 6, 1943, Wise,
Watkins, and W. T. Gleason executed another lease in which
Wise -stated that it was his intention "to admit ownership" of the
minerals in W. T. Gleason and Watkins, "and extend the dura-
tion thereof." This lease was notarized and recorded. W. T.
Gleason sold his mineral interest to R. R. Gleason. Thereafter
other defendants purchased portions of R. R. Gleason's mineral
interest, relying on the joint lease. Wise brought suits against
Watkins, Gleason, and Gleason's vendees alleging slander of title.
Held, (1) In a sale of land, attempted withholding of mineral
rights not then belonging to the vendor is not sufficient acknowl-
edgment to interrupt prescription. (2) A servitude prescribed
for ten years non-user is a dead thing, and cannot be revived
by the renunciation of prescription. (3) Vendees of mineral
rights cannot rely on one instrument of the public records and
disregard others showing the lapse of more than ten years since
the creation of the servitude. Wise v. Watkins, Wise & Gleason,
62 So. 2d 653 (La. 1952).
In Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Nabors Oil and Gas Co.,'
the court held that the expression, "all mineral rights are ex-
pressly reserved, having heretofore been sold by the present
vendor . . .-2 was sufficient acknowledgment to interrupt the
19. See note 2 supra.
1. 149 La. 100, 88 So. 723 (1921).
2. 149 La. 100, 105, 88 So. 723, 724.
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